States of the brain are, in the first place, effects, the effects of other physical states. Many states of the brain, secondly, are correlates, A particular state accompanied my experience the other moment of thinking about having walked a lot on Hampstead Heath, and a like state accompanies each like experience: each of my eyperiences of thinking of having walked a lot on Hampstead Heath. Given our present concern, it is traditional that the most important experiences are decidings and choosings. Some states of the brain, thirdly, are causes, both of other states of the brain and also of certain movements of one´s body. The latter are actions. Some are relatively simple while others, such as speech acts and bits of ritual, depend on settings of convention and have compex histories. Simple or complex, however, all actions are movements, or of course stillnesses, caused by states of the brain. It follows from these three premisses, about states of the brain as effects, as correlates and as causes, that on every occasion when we act, we can only act as in fact we do. It follows too that we are not responsible for our actions, and, what is most fundamental, that we do not possess selves of a certain character. Determinism, one determinism, can be expressed in these sentences, the latter two of which contain belaboured terms that can be put to other uses. A particular action can be the effect of two brain states and another physical state, which together are a sufficient condition of the action. Correlated with the brain states are conscious states, perhaps a desire and a perception. The three states which give rise to the action are themselves the effects of other physical states, some of them being brain states themselves. None of the initial array of states has a correlate in consciousness.